Cash holdings, firm size and access to external finance : evidence for the Euro Area by Martínez Carrascal, Carmen
CASH HOLDINGS, FIRM SIZE AND 
ACCESS TO EXTERNAL FINANCE. 
EVIDENCE FOR THE EURO AREA
Carmen Martínez-Carrascal
Documentos de Trabajo 
N.º 1034
2010
CASH HOLDINGS, FIRM SIZE AND ACCESS TO EXTERNAL FINANCE. 
EVIDENCE FOR THE EURO AREA 
 CASH HOLDINGS, FIRM SIZE AND ACCESS TO EXTERNAL 
FINANCE. EVIDENCE FOR THE EURO AREA 
Carmen Martínez-Carrascal (*) 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 
 
 
 (*) This paper was partly developed during a stay at the European Central Bank, to which I am very grateful for providing 
the data. I thank R. Blanco, O. Bover, C. Barceló, L. Hospido, M. Menner and the rest of the participants in the internal 
seminars at the Banco de España and an anonymous referee for useful suggestions and S. Scopel for her help with the 
data. The views expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Banco de España. 
 
.  
 
 
 
Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 1034 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and finance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, 
therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
 
 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the INTERNET at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es. 
 
 
 
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged. 
 
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2010 
 
ISSN: 0213-2710 (print) 
ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line) 
Depósito legal: M-49056-2010      
Unidad de Publicaciones, Banco de España
Abstract 
This paper investigates the empirical determinants of corporate cash holdings in the 
euro area as a function of firm size. The results show that there are significant differences 
in investment in liquid assets for firms of different size. More specifically, liquid assets for 
smaller firms in the euro area are more strongly linked to firm cash flow and its variability than 
cash holdings for larger firms, possibly as a result of their more restricted access to external 
funds and the need to provide for future investment needs. Likewise, results show that the 
link between cash holdings and tangible assets, which facilitate access to external finance, 
is stronger for small and medium-sized firms than for large firms. In contrast, cash holding 
sensitivity to variations in the spread between the return on liquid assets and alternative 
uses of these funds (debt repayment, in the empirical specification presented in this paper) 
is higher for larger firms, something that might be linked to their better access to capital 
markets and their lower need to keep a cash buffer for precautionary reasons. 
Keywords:  cash holdings, financing constraints, panel data. 
JEL classification:  C23, E41, G31, G32. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper looks at the empirical determinants of firms’ cash holdings in the euro area, 
focussing on those aspects that might result from precautionary reasons and, specifically, 
from limited access to external finance. For this purpose, the paper analyses to what extent 
there are differences in the relative importance of the factors conditioning firms’ cash holdings 
by firm size, a variable which is usually considered a reasonably good proxy for the degree of 
financial constraints faced by the company (smaller firms are usually younger, more opaque 
and less well known and thus potentially more vulnerable to capital market imperfections). 
Some recent studies stress the relevance of cash policies in the context of imperfect 
capital markets, in which firms’ access to external finance is limited. They argue that the 
existence of financing constraints can be tested by analysing the sensitivity of cash holdings 
to cash flow and its variability, which avoids the main criticism of the interpretation of positive 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow as a sign of the existence of financial constraints 
[see Alti (2003), amongst others]: if current cash flow is correlated with firms’ investment 
opportunities, and the latter are not properly measured, the positive investment sensitivity 
to cash flow could simply be reflecting the link between investment and investment 
opportunities. This problem does not arise when the existence of financing constraints is 
tested by measuring the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flow and its variability: if a firm 
does not face financing constraints it has no need to provide for future investment needs, 
and hence its cash holdings should not depend either on cash flow or on cash flow variability. 
However, if firms do face financing constraints, they can decide to hold more cash to hedge 
against the possibility of falling short of cash in the future and hence not being able to 
carry out valuable investment projects. Thus, differences in the sensitivity of cash holdings 
to cash flow, and its variability across different groups of firms, could be signalling differences 
in access to external finance. Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and Han and 
Qiu (2007) exploit this idea and analyse the sensitivity of cash holdings to, respectively, 
cash flow and cash flow variations. However, with regard to the sensitivity of cash holdings 
to cash flow, two recent papers by Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2009) and Riddick 
and Whited (2009) question the use of a positive sensitivity to cash flow as a tool to obtain 
evidence of restricted access to external finance for certain groups of firms. 
The analysis presented here supplements previous studies on the impact of financing 
constraints on cash holding policies, which have mainly focussed on US firms and on the 
analysis of the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flow and its variations (see Section 2 for a 
review of such studies). For the euro area, only Pál and Ferrando (2010) have addressed 
this issue previously, focussing on the analysis of liquid asset saving policies (that is, 
on cash holding changes) and, specifically, on the link between cash flow and cash savings. 
The analysis presented here differs from that study in two main aspects: first, it looks at 
cash holding levels (relative to assets), rather than at their change; second, it looks not only 
at the link between cash holdings and cash flow, but also at the impact on cash policies of 
other variables linked to firms’ access to external finance, such as cash flow variability and the 
collateral available. There is also an important difference between the analysis here presented 
and previous papers that analyse the link between cash holdings and size: the analysis is not 
restricted to listed or (mainly) large firms, as in these previous papers. Instead, in the sample 
used here unlisted and small and medium-sized firms, which are those expected to have a 
more difficult access to external finance, prevail. In particular, the sample used for the analysis 
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contains around 0.5 million firm-year observations, more than 95% of them being for small 
or medium-sized firms (SMEs). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: after reviewing the existing literature on 
this field in Section 2, Section 3 presents a descriptive analysis of the relationship between 
cash holdings and their potential determinants, Section 4 sets out the results of the 
econometric analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Literature review 
According to the trade-off theory, firms choose their cash holding levels by balancing 
the marginal costs and the marginal benefits of holding cash. The main cost is the opportunity 
cost of capital invested in liquid assets instead of in other assets with a higher return. 
The benefits related to higher cash holdings are the lower transaction costs (associated with 
using cash for payments without having to liquidate assets), a lower likelihood of suffering 
financial distress and the possibility of executing investment projects that could not be carried 
out without these funds owing to the existence of financial constraints. 
The link between financial constraints and firms’ demand for liquid assets can help to 
identify to what extent firms of different size face different degrees of financial restrictions.1 
As has been mentioned in the introduction, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and 
Han and Qiu (2007) have focussed on the estimation of cash holding equations as a tool 
to assess the existence of financing constraints using data for US companies. In the first 
of these papers, the authors claim that a positive sensitivity of cash holdings to cash 
flow indicates the existence of financing constraints: if firms are financially unconstrained, 
their cash holdings should not respond to either current cash flow or investment opportunities 
and hence they should not display a systematic propensity to save cash out of their cash 
flows; if instead firms anticipate financing restrictions in the future, they can respond to these 
potential constraints by hoarding cash today as a way of providing for future investment 
needs, something that is not necessary for unconstrained firms. Using a sample of publicly 
traded manufacturing firms, they test empirically whether the propensity to save cash out of 
cash flows is positive for a group of constrained firms (which they define using a function 
of alternative variables that proxy for the likelihood that firms face financing constraints) 
and non-significant for financially unconstrained firms, and they obtain results in line with their 
priors.2 
Han and Qiu (2007) extend the model of Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) 
and analyse the role of financial constraints in the link between corporate cash holdings and 
cash flow variability. They argue that if a firm has unrestricted access to external funds, 
it has no need to provide for future investment needs and hence its cash policies should 
not depend on cash flow variability. They find, using a sample of US publicly traded 
companies, that the link between these two variables depends on the degree of financing 
constraints faced by the firm, being positive and significant for constrained firms only. 
When they use the size of the firm as a proxy for the degree of financing constraints 
faced by the firm, they find that the cash holdings of smaller firms respond positively to cash 
flow variability, while for large companies liquid assets do not react to changes in this variable. 
The results in Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) contrast with those in 
Riddick and Whited (2009), who find that, after controlling for Tobin’s q (and for errors in its 
                                                                          
1. In parallel to this strand of the literature that studies the impact of financing constraints on cash holding policies, 
there is a vast one which focuses on studying the existence of economies of scale in money demand, hence 
emphasising the transaction motive for holding cash [see Lotti and Marcucci (2007) for a review of this literature]. 
2. Viral, Almeida and Campello (2005) model the interplay between cash and debt policies in the presence of financial 
constraints. Their empirical analysis is carried out using a sample of US publicly traded (manufacturing) firms, and their 
results suggest that financially constrained firms with high hedging needs have a strong propensity to save cash out of 
cash flows, while showing no propensity to reduce outstanding debt. In contrast, constrained firms with low hedging 
needs systematically channel free cash flows towards debt reduction, as opposed to cash savings. The authors 
conclude from their evidence that cash should not be viewed as negative debt. 
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measurement), cash holding accumulation and cash flow are negatively related. They argue 
that this negative propensity to save occurs because a positive (and positively correlated) 
productivity shock causes both cash flow and the marginal product of capital to increase. 
Nonetheless, their model show a positive relationship between a firm’s risk and its level 
of cash, in line with the results in Han and Qiu (2007). More recently, Almeida, Campello 
and Weisbach (2009) extend and refine the analysis presented in Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach (2004) and find, in contrast with their previous results, that the cash flow sensitivity 
of cash can be positive or negative for financially constrained firms. The different conclusion 
they reach is explained by the fact that in Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) it is 
assumed that all fixed investment is illiquid, while Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2009) 
introduce the possibility of investing in liquid assets other than cash, and under this scenario 
the cash flow sensitivity of cash is not necessarily positive even for constrained firms. 
Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2007) find that the cash flow sensitivity of cash depends on 
constrained firms’ hedging needs. If hedging needs are high (that is, if future cash flows and 
investment opportunities are not highly correlated), then constrained firms tend to save cash 
out of cash flows. 
More generally, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) examine the 
determinants and implications of holdings of cash and marketable securities. As in 
the previous two papers, they use a sample of US publicly traded firms, for the period 
1971 to 1994. They find that firms with strong growth opportunities and riskier cash flows 
hold relatively high ratios of cash to total non-cash assets, while firms that have greater 
access to the capital markets, such as large firms and those with high credit ratings, tend to 
have lower cash ratios. 
For the euro area, the studies on corporate cash holding policies at micro level 
are scarce and focus on large firms.3 An exception is Martínez-Carrascal and von 
Landesberger (2010), who analyse cash holdings from a macro and micro perspective 
and use the same database used in this paper. However, this paper does not report results 
by size (or by any other firm characteristic that might be linked to the degree of financing 
constraints). Ferreira and Vilela (2004) analyse the determinants of corporate cash holdings 
in euro area countries, but only for publicly traded firms, while Pál and Ferrando (2010) 
analyse the changes in firms’ cash holding ratios from the standpoint of identifying financing 
constraints using a sample in which large firms prevail. In the first of these papers, cash 
holdings of publicly traded firms are found to be positively linked to investment opportunities 
and to cash flow, and negatively linked to leverage and size, findings that are also in line 
with the results in Martínez-Carrascal and von Landesberger (2008). The paper by Pál and 
Ferrando (2010) extends the analysis in Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) to euro area 
firms. They use the same database used in this paper, but, since their analysis relies on firms 
with consolidated accounts, which are usually not available for small firms, large companies 
and large corporate groups prevail in their sample. Their results are not in line with those 
of Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) for US firms, since they find that all types of 
euro area firm, regardless of their financing conditions, display a positive sensitivity of cash 
holdings to cash flow, and in fact they estimate the highest sensitivity for firms operating 
under the best financing conditions (those classified as unconstrained firms). They explain this 
puzzling result by arguing that the higher sensitivity estimated for unconstrained firms simply 
reflects the high growth opportunities of this group of firms. 
                                                                          
3. There are numerous papers focused on the estimation of the elasticity of cash holdings to sales at a country level 
[see for example Adao and Mata (1999) or Bover and Watson (2005)]. 
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3 A preliminary look at the links between size, cash holdings and the 
determinants of cash holdings 
This section presents, primarily in graphical form, a preliminary analysis of firms’ cash 
holdings in the euro area. First, it illustrates the variability in the cross-sectional distribution 
of the variable of interest, the cash holding ratio (defined as the ratio of cash and cash 
equivalent to total assets), for different firm size classes over time.4 Then, it presents a 
bivariate analysis of the relationship between cash holdings and some of their potential 
determinants, for different firm size classes. 
The data used for the analysis were obtained from the AMADEUS database of the 
Bureau van Dijk, which contains profit and loss account and balance sheet data on 
private and publicly owned firms across eleven euro area countries for the period 1990-2005. 
For the purpose of the analysis, euro area listed and unlisted private non-financial 
enterprises are considered. Whenever available, consolidated annual accounts are used as 
these are considered to be more suitable for providing information about the financial situation 
of a company with subsidiaries. When consolidated data are not available, unconsolidated 
data are used. Thus, since many small and medium-sized (SMEs) firms provide only 
unconsolidated accounts, a large number of SMEs are included in the sample, which would 
have been excluded otherwise. 
The first two years are excluded because of the poor coverage across countries and 
some additional years are not used for the construction of the variables for the econometric 
analysis. After some filtering to eliminate inconsistent observations, an unbalanced panel 
of around 85,000 firms with about 500,000 observations for the period 1998-2005 is 
obtained. Around 82% of the observations correspond to small firms, while 14% correspond 
to medium-sized firms and just 4% to large companies.5 With regard to the country 
composition, French, Italian and Spanish companies account for a large proportion of the 
total sample; for all size classes companies from each of these countries account for at least 
one fifth of all enterprises in the sample. 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics (the mean, median and standard 
deviation) for the firm-level variables used in the analysis for the sample period (1998-2005) 
for each size group. The distribution for the cash holding ratio (cash and cash equivalent 
to total assets) appears to be strongly positively skewed for all size classes and there 
seems to be an inverse relationship between size and cash holdings, as the mean and 
median cash holding ratios of smaller firms are higher; smaller firms hold not only higher 
levels of cash holdings but also of other types of short-term assets (net working capital) 
in their balance sheets. In contrast, tangible assets make up a lower proportion of their total 
assets. These descriptive statistics do not show a clear link between cash flow and firm size, 
                                                                          
4. In applied work, the variables used to capture the transaction motive are sales, under the inventory approach, or, in a 
portfolio framework as here, total assets. See Vogel and Maddala (1967) for a comparison of the patterns observed 
in both ratios.  
5. For the size class definitions, I use the classification adopted by the European Commission that relies on the number 
of employees and on a joint condition on either total assets or turnover. The thresholds for assets and turnover which 
define different size classes are adjusted over time, using the gross value added deflator. 
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or between size and cash flow variability, which is measured by means of the coefficient of 
variation of firms’ cash flow over the previous five years.6 
Charts 1.1-1.3 illustrate the variability in the cross-sectional distribution of cash 
holding ratios for different firm size classes over time. More specifically, they show the 25th, 
50th and 75th percentiles of the cash holding ratio for large, medium and small firms, 
respectively. A comparison of these three charts reveals that the distribution of this ratio has 
much higher values for smaller firms; for example, the median cash holding ratio for small 
firms is on average almost 2.5 times higher than the median value of this ratio for large firms. 
Also the dispersion of the distribution is larger for smaller firms (although not if the dispersion 
is normalised by the median cash holding ratio in the corresponding size class). The charts 
also show that there has been a slight upward shift in the upper part of the distribution 
for all size classes from the year 2000. This shift is not observed in the lower percentiles, 
which are very stable over time for all size classes. 
The rest of the charts compare, for each size class, the median cash holding ratio in 
different corporate groupings defined on the basis of alternative variables that may influence 
cash holding levels. Each chart presents the median cash holding ratio for firms with high, 
medium and low levels, respectively, of that indicator. For example, Charts 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 
depict the median cash holding ratio for firms belonging to the top, median and bottom 
deciles of the cash flow distribution. The median decile (which includes firms between 
percentiles 45 and 55) can be regarded as representative of the behaviour of the typical or 
average firm in terms of cash flow, while the top (bottom) decile includes the 10% of firms 
with the highest (lowest) value of this ratio. These charts show noticeable differences 
in the link between cash holdings and cash flow for different size classes: while these two 
variables are positively linked for smaller firms, there is no clear relationship between them 
for large firms, according to this bivariate analysis. As cash flow is correlated with growth 
opportunities, this could partly reflect a higher impact of growth opportunities on cash 
holdings for smaller firms, which may have more restricted access to external finance, 
although a genuinely higher impact of cash flow on cash holdings for smaller firms might also 
be behind this pattern [see for example Ferreira and Vilela (2004) or Han and Qiu (2007)]. 
As for the link between cash holdings and cash flow variability, this descriptive analysis 
does not point towards a positive relationship between these two variables: as can be seen 
in Charts 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, firms with more uncertain cash flows are in fact those holding 
lower levels of cash holdings, especially in the case of smaller firms. 
Charts 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show a negative relationship between cash holdings and 
the proportion of tangible assets in firms’ balance sheets, which might be linked to the easier 
and less costly access to external finance afforded by collateral. Again, the link appears to be 
stronger for SMEs than for large firms. This relationship seems to be non-linear, especially for 
SMEs, as the difference in cash holding ratios for firms with low and medium levels of tangible 
assets is much smaller than the difference in cash holding ratios for firms with medium and 
high levels of tangible assets. 
Charts 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 show the link between indebtedness and cash holdings. 
A priori, the link between these two variables is ambiguous: on the one hand, more indebted 
firms have a higher opportunity cost of holding cash; on the other, higher leverage increases 
the probability of bankruptcy and firms might try to reduce the probability of experiencing 
                                                                          
6. That is, the standard deviation divided by the mean (in absolute value) of the cash flows.  
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financial distress by holding more cash. The descriptive evidence shown in these 
charts seems to indicate that the first effect dominates for the companies in the sample, 
as there seems to be a negative relationship between these variables. Finally, as expected, 
there is also a negative relationship between cash holdings and the ratio of net working 
capital to assets (short-term assets other than cash and its equivalents), in line with the fact 
that cash and working capital are substitutes (liquid assets other than cash can be more 
easily liquidated than other assets in the event of a cash shortage). 
To sum up, this descriptive analysis shows that there is significant heterogeneity 
in cash holdings for firms of different size, and also, at least according to this simple bivariate 
analysis, in the relationship between cash holdings and several balance sheet and profit and 
loss account indicators for SMEs and for large firms. 
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4 Estimation results   
The equation to be estimated is: 
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where i indexes companies i=1, 2...N, t indexes the year t=1, 2...T, and c indexes the country 
c = 1, 2…C in which firm I operates. Cash is the cash holding ratio and, as mentioned above, 
is constructed as the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets, spread, which 
captures the opportunity cost of holding cash, is the difference between the long-term 
interest rate on bank lending to non-financial corporations and the M3 rate,7 CF is the cash 
flow to total assets ratio, CV is the cash flow volatility, NWC is the net working capital 
(short-term assets minus cash and its equivalents divided by total assets), TA is the ratio of 
tangible assets to total assets, L is the leverage ratio (debt to assets), i are company-specific 
fixed effects, Өt are time effects that control for macroeconomic influences on cash holdings 
that are common across companies, Si control for sectoral effects that are constant over time 
and  is a serially-uncorrelated, but possibly heteroskedastic error.8 
As mentioned in the previous section, a positive coefficient is expected for cash flow 
variability in the context of credit market imperfections, while negative ones are expected for 
the spread between the long-term interest rate on bank lending to non-financial corporations 
and the M3 rate, net working capital (the closest substitute in firms’ balance sheets for 
cash holdings) and the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. As for cash flow, a positive sign 
might be expected, even for non-financially constrained firms, as growth opportunities, 
which are correlated with cash flow and empirically have been found to have a positive impact 
on cash holdings, are not controlled for.9 Finally, there are no clear predictions about the 
impact of leverage on liquid asset holdings. Two lags of the endogenous variable are also 
included to control, as usual in the literature, for potential persistence in cash holdings. 
The estimation method consists of the GMM system estimator proposed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and examined in detail in Blundell and Bond (1998). These models control 
for unobservable firm-specific fixed effects, the estimator being an extension of the GMM 
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) that estimates equations not only in first differences 
but also in levels.10 Apart from the biases that would arise if fixed effects were not controlled 
                                                                          
7. That is, the rate associated with banknotes and coins, short-term deposits and short-term marketable instruments 
issued by monetary and financial institutions in the euro area. 
8. Country dummies were excluded from the specification because they turned out to be non-significant. 
9. Most companies in the sample are unlisted and hence the Tobin’s q cannot be calculated as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. 
10. The use of the GMM system estimator is especially justified in the case of autoregressive models with high 
persistence in the data, so that the lagged levels of a variable are not highly correlated with the first difference, 
which results in finite sample biases associated with weak instruments in the first-difference estimator [see Blundell 
and Bond (1998)]. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that in these circumstances also including the levels equations in 
the system estimator offers significant gains, countering the bias. They also show that in autoregressive distributed 
lag models, first differences of the variables can be used as instruments in the levels equations provided that 
they are mean stationary. The high levels of serial correlation displayed by several variables included in the models 
and the fact that they can be regarded as mean stationary favour the use of a GMM system estimator rather than the 
first-difference estimator. 
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for, it is also necessary to take into account that most current firm-specific variables are 
endogenous (it is likely that shocks affecting firm cash holdings also affect other firm-specific 
characteristics such as cash flow). Likewise, it is possible that the observed relationship 
between cash holding ratios and other balance sheet characteristics reflects the effects of 
cash on the latter or vice versa. In order to avoid the bias associated with this endogeneity 
and reverse causality problem, a GMM estimator is used, taking lags of the dependent and 
explanatory variables as instruments, and including all balance sheet right hand side variables 
lagged one period. 
The estimation method requires the absence of second order serial correlation 
in the first-differenced residuals for which the test of Arellano and Bond (1991) is presented 
(labelled M2). If the underlying model’s residuals are white noise then first-order serial 
correlation should be expected in the first-differenced residuals for which the test of 
Arellano and Bond (1991), labelled M1, is also presented. The results of the Sargan test 
of overidentifying restrictions as a test for instrument validity is also reported. Table 2 
show the results obtained when the equation is estimated separately for large, medium 
and small firms. The expected first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals 
is found while there is no evidence of second order serial correlation, the key requirement 
for validity of our instrumentation strategy, and the Sargan test statistics are insignificant at 
conventional 5% significance levels.11 For each regressor, the table presents the p-value 
associated with the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient for small and large firms is 
not statistically significant. 
As can be seen in the table, the first lag of the endogenous variable (and the 
second one, for large and medium firms) is found to be clearly significant, indicating, 
in line with previous studies, persistence in firms’ cash holdings. This persistence is, 
according to the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, quite large. 
The signs obtained for the rest of the regressors are also in line with expectations, 
and point towards significant differences in cash holding policies across firm size groups. 
As for cash flow, unlike the results in Pál and Ferrando (2010), this variable seems to have a 
stronger bearing on the cash holding policies of smaller firms, for which larger coefficients 
are estimated. Since cash flow is correlated with growth opportunities, the higher sensitivity 
estimated for smaller firms might indicate that cash holdings of large firms respond less to 
growth opportunities than those of smaller firms, who, anticipating a more restrictive 
access to external finance, might respond by hoarding more cash today to avoid the risk of 
being unable to fund profitable investment projects, while large firms do not need to do so.12 
Apart from the effect of growth opportunities on cash holdings, there could also be a 
genuinely higher impact of cash flow on cash holdings for smaller firms [see for example 
                                                                          
11. See the bottom part of the table for a list of the instruments used for each size class. When common instruments 
were used across all size groups, the M2 and Sargan tests in some cases reported values above standard critical values. 
Accordingly, different sets of instruments where used for each of the size groups. The main results presented here 
remain valid when common instruments are used (see Table A.1 in the Appendix), although in this case the p-value 
associated with the M2 and Sargan tests for the estimation for small firms is rather low.  
12. It is possible that the significant and higher sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flow could simply be reflecting 
the larger information content of cash holdings about future investment opportunities for SMEs. The data do not seem to 
point in this direction, as the cash flow information content on future investment opportunities seems to be similar for all 
size groups. To check the predictive power of cash flow for investment opportunities across size groups, sales growth 
(or cash flow) was regressed on past cash flows. The estimated coefficients do not point towards significant differences 
in the predictive power of cash flow across size groups which, at most, would be lower for smaller firms. When trying to 
control for growth opportunities through the inclusion of the growth rate of sales in the specification, the existing 
correlation between cash flow and growth rate of sales resulted in collinearity problems, and a larger coefficient was 
estimated for cash flow while a negative one was obtained for the growth rate of sales. 
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Ferreira and Vilela (2004) or Han and Qiu (2007)], which is difficult to estimate here as 
the usual Tobin’s q cannot be constructed to proxy for growth opportunities as most of the 
companies are unlisted. 
In addition, and consistent with the results reported in Han and Qiu (2007), evidence 
is found that cash flow volatility positively affects cash holdings, in line with the precautionary 
motive for holding cash; as in the results for US firms reported in Han and Qiu (2007), 
the coefficient is only significant (and quantitatively larger) for small firms, which, again, could 
be linked to their comparatively more limited access to external finance. More specifically, 
the estimated coefficient for this variable implies that for an increase of one standard deviation 
in cash flow volatility, the cash holding ratio increases by 0.8 pp (9.5% of the median cash 
holding ratio in the sample). The positive link between cash holdings and cash flow volatility 
for firms with a limited access to external finance could result, as Han and Qiu (2007) indicate, 
in a negative relationship between current investment and cash flow volatility for financially 
constrained firms, in contrast to unconstrained firms, that can carry out all their positive net 
present value investment projects. The estimated coefficient is higher than that found in Han 
and Qiu (2007) for constrained firms, which does not necessarily reflect a more restricted 
access to external finance for (constrained) European firms than for US ones, but could 
rather be the result of the existing differences in the sample composition used in both studies 
[in the sample used here small and unlisted firms prevail, while the analysis in Han and 
Qiu (2007) is based on a sample of listed firms)]. 
Likewise, as expected, the cash holding ratio depends negatively on the opportunity 
cost of holding cash. For all size classes, this variable is found to be the one exerting the 
highest impact on firms’ cash holding ratio, but this sensitivity seems to vary significantly 
across size groups, being higher for larger firms. More specifically, the estimated coefficient 
for large companies is more than twice as high as that estimated for smaller companies 
(that estimated for medium-sized companies lies in the middle, although it is somewhat closer 
to the one found for the smallest firms). This result could be driven by the possibly lower need 
of large companies to save cash for precautionary reasons. 
As for leverage, a negative coefficient is estimated for all size groups. However, it is 
found to be significant only for smaller firms; the magnitude of the estimated coefficient 
is similar for small and medium firms, but for this latter group the coefficient is rather 
imprecisely estimated and hence not significant. In contrast, the estimated coefficient for large 
firms is close to zero. Similarly, the estimated coefficient for the ratio of tangible assets to total 
assets is larger for SMEs, and only significant for these companies. This might be signalling 
that the access to external finance for smaller firms is more strongly linked to collateral 
availability than for large firms, in line with the evidence found in Coluzzi, Ferrando and 
Martínez-Carrascal (2008). Finally, firms holding higher levels of assets that can be considered 
as cash substitutes (higher net working capital) hold less cash. The link is stronger for larger 
companies, while for small companies the coefficient is much smaller than for large firms 
and falls short of significance. 
Overall, these results indicate that there are significant differences in firms’ cash 
holding policies across size groups; the cash holdings of larger firms tend to respond more to 
the spread between the return on cash holdings and that on alternative uses of these funds, 
while for smaller firms cash holding policies seem to be more conditioned by their cash flow 
and its volatility and the share of tangible assets in their balance sheets, potentially as a result 
of their more limited access to external finance. Also leverage seems to condition more 
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importantly cash holdings of smaller firms. The difference between the estimated coefficients 
for large and small firms is statistically significant at conventional significance levels for all the 
regressors, except the second lag of the cash holding ratio and leverage (see the last column 
of Table 2). 
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5 Conclusions  
This paper investigates the empirical determinants of corporate cash holdings in the euro 
area as a function of firm size. It supplements previous analysis on the impact of financing 
constraints on cash holdings policies, which has been mainly based on US firms and on 
the analysis of the link between cash holdings and cash flows and their variation. For the 
euro area, only Pál and Ferrando (2010) have addressed this issue previously, focussing on 
the analysis of liquid asset saving policies (or cash holding changes) and, specifically, on the 
link between cash holdings and cash flow. Instead, the analysis presented here looks 
at the differences in the link between cash holding levels and their determinants for firms 
of different size; not only the impact of cash flow on cash holdings is analysed but also 
that of other variables such as cash flow variability and the collateral available, which are 
also linked to the access to external finance and hence may also affect cash policies. 
The prevalence of small firms in the database used for the analysis is also an important 
difference with respect to previous papers in this literature, which have based their analysis 
on listed or (mainly) large firms. 
The descriptive and econometric evidence set out in this paper indicates that 
cash policies differ significantly across firms of different size, something that could be 
linked to differences in their access to external finance. The cash holdings of smaller firms 
seem to be more conditioned by precautionary reasons than those of large firms, since the 
cash holding ratios of smaller firms respond more to cash flow variability; likewise, the cash 
holdings of smaller firms are more strongly linked to cash flow than those of large firms, 
which may reflect the fact that the cash holdings of smaller firms are more affected 
by growth opportunities than those of large firms, but also a genuinely higher impact of cash 
flow on cash holdings. This could suggest that the investment decisions of smaller firms might 
be suboptimal due to their more restricted access to external finance, which forces them to 
hold more liquid assets, in response to higher cash flow variability (and, potentially, also when 
they have more growth opportunities), than larger firms do. Likewise, the negative link 
between cash holdings and tangible assets, which can be used as collateral when asking 
for a loan and hence give easier access to external finance, is stronger for SMEs. In contrast, 
cash holdings for larger firms, with better access to capital markets, might be less influenced 
by precautionary reasons and this might explain why their cash policies are more sensitive to 
variations in the opportunity cost of holding cash (the spread between the return on liquid 
assets and that on alternative uses of these funds, such as debt repayment). Finally, the level 
of short-term assets other than cash seems to be more strongly linked to cash holding 
ratios for larger than for smaller firms, while leverage seems to be a more important factor 
in the determination of the cash holdings of smaller firms. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
Cash 0.074 0.033 0.105 0.084 0.041 0.109 0.139 0.084 0.153
CF 0.081 0.075 0.086 0.077 0.067 0.079 0.085 0.071 0.090
CFV 1.054 0.349 2.863 0.947 0.358 2.585 1.042 0.428 2.615
NWC 0.342 0.340 0.216 0.371 0.375 0.209 0.417 0.413 0.264
TA 0.252 0.198 0.214 0.218 0.170 0.185 0.205 0.144 0.193
L 0.691 0.709 0.213 0.692 0.719 0.208 0.692 0.709 0.242
Medium firmsLarge firms
Note : Cash is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets, CF is the cash flow to total assets ratio, CV is
the cash flow volatil ity, defined as the coefficient of variation of firms’ cash flow over the past five years, NWC is the net
working capital (short tem assets minus cash and its equivalents divided by total assets), TA is the ratio of tangible assets
to total assets, L is the leverage ratio (debt divided by assets). 
Small firms
 
 
Table 2. Cash holding determinants. Estimation results 
Statistical 
difference: 
small vs. 
coefficient std error coefficient std error coefficient std error p-value
Cash it-1 0.624 0.048 0.570 0.109 0.809 0.095 0.04
Cash it-2 0.087 0.020 0.188 0.090 0.025 0.080 0.77
CF it 0.082 0.049 0.183 0.066 0.235 0.051 0.02
Spread -0.844 0.238 -0.455 0.230 -0.375 0.179 0.02
CFV it 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.05
NWC it-1 -0.069 0.041 -0.041 0.025 -0.012 0.008 0.09
(TA/A)it-1 0.009 0.030 -0.049 0.025 -0.046 0.015 0.03
L it -0.008 0.016 -0.012 0.016 -0.013 0.008 0.39
M1
M2
Sargan
Number of firms
Number of observations
Large firms Medium firms Small firms
0.00 0.00 0.00
3382 11255 69459
21477
0.11 0.46 0.16
71853 421200
0.39 0.11 0.16
 
Note: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors 
reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one step method (Blundell and Bond,1998; Arellano 
and Bond, 1998).Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported).Mj is a test of jth-order serial 
correlation in the first differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged 
values of the regressors: Large firms: Cash (t-2, t-3),CF (t-2, t-3)CFV(t-3 to t-5), TA (t-4,t-5); Medium firms: Cash (t-5),CF 
(t-5) CFV (t-4 to t-6), NWC (t-5,t-6) TA (t-5, t-6),L (t-5);Small firms: Cash (t-6),CFV(t-4 to t-6),TA (t-5). In levels equations, 
first differences of the regressors dated as follows: Large firms: Cash (t-4), CF (t-4),NWC (t-5), TA (t-5), L (t-1); Medium 
firms: Cash (t-4), CF (t-4),NWC (t-4),TA (t-3),L (t-3);Small firms: Cash (t-4),CF (t-4),NWC (t-4), TA (t-5), L (t-3)*,**,*** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Last column shows the p-value associated with 
the null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is statistically different for small and large firms. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Cash holding determinants. Estimation results with common instruments 
for all size classes 
Statistical 
difference: 
small vs. 
large
coefficient std error coefficient std error coefficient std error p-value
Cash it-1 0.616 0.051 0.553 0.107 0.809 0.095 0.20
Cash it-2 0.086 0.020 0.197 0.088 0.025 0.080 0.08
CF it 0.097 0.091 0.171 0.066 0.235 0.051 0.04
Spread -0.890 0.271 -0.483 0.227 -0.375 0.179 0.00
CFV it 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.08
NWC it-1 -0.073 0.044 -0.046 0.024 -0.012 0.008 0.18
(TA/A)it-1 -0.020 0.035 -0.053 0.025 -0.046 0.015 0.07
L it -0.005 0.021 -0.015 0.016 -0.013 0.008 0.05
M1
M2
Sargan
Number of firms
Number of observations
11255 69459
21477
0.00 0.00 0.00
71853 421200
0.39 0.09 0.00
3382
Large firms Medium firms Small firms
0.11 0.39 0.04
 
 
Note: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. 
Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell andBond,1998;Arellano andBond,1998).Sargan is a 
Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported).Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-
values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: Cash (t-5), CF (t-5) CFV (t-4 to t-6), 
NWC (t-5,t-6) TA (t-5, t-6), L (t-5). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: Cash (t-4), CF (t-4), NWC (t-3), 
TA (t-3), L (t-3); *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Last column shows the p-value associated with the 
null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is statistically different for small and large firms. 
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